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Abstract
Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive
duopolies. First we show that using a limited set of feasible contracts,
exclusive dealing and purchasing is going to be preferred, regardless of
the level of product differentiation. In the next step, we make the choice
of quality endogenous and derive the equilibrium conditions for qualities
under the aforementioned contractual arrangement. Our final proposition
shows that in this case the choice of quality depends exclusively on the
valuation of the median consumer.
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1 Introduction
Papers on exclusive dealing almost exclusively (pun intended) focus on fore-
closure, possibly with vertical integration and cartelization of the downstream
market, e.g. in Chen and Riordan (2007). However, the choice of distribution
methods is a much more complex topic. Moner-Colonques, Sempere-Monerris
and Urbano (2004) give a detailed analysis of potential distribution setups and
the influencing factors.
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We intend to focus on one specific arrangement: exclusive distribution and
exclusive purchasing. Here the manufacturer sells the good through an inde-
pendent single brand store which carries only their product line. This setup
is rather typical in car dealerships, but not unknown in consumer electronics
(where Apple in many countries sells only through brand stores and Sony relies
heavily on brand stores as well) or even in Hungarian bakeries.
In line with the focus of our study, we limit the structure of possible contracts
between manufacturers and retailers. Though it might seem too restricting,
this helps us find an equilibrium in pure strategies, thus avoiding the ”bumping
problem” haunting models with take-it-or-leave-it offers, mentioned by Inderst
(2010). Though we only show the dominance of choosing exclusive distribution
and exclusive purchasing in this limited setup, other factors might steer compa-
nies towards single-brand stores. One example would be the bias in consumer
judgements when brands are presented in isolation (see Posavac et al. (2005)).
On the other hand, we try to be more general in the field of product and retailer
differentiation. Our model presents vertically differentiated upstream firms and
a horizontally differentiated downstream market. Besides making our model
more general, it also gives a more intuitive understanding of the decisions of the
firms. As in the previous literature, we used linear contracts to focus on the
strategic element in the choice of contracts.
Endogenous quality choice in an oligopolistic setup was discussed by Jing
(2006), although without a retail sector. Our final proposition, just like his
paper, arrives to an equilibrium condition related to consumer valuations and
the steepness of the cost curves with respect to quality.
Recently the issue of product quality has also gained emphasis in discussions
of distribution policies, though the focus is still on foreclosure as in Yehezkel
(2008) and Argenton (2010). Our paper rather want to focus on an endogenous
choice of quality determined by the contractual environment, since it might
serve as a starting point for a later, more detailed analysis of welfare effects. In
a way, our findings reflect that of Moner-Colonques, Sempere-Monerris and Ur-
bano (2004) who concluded that exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing
is prevalent when product differentiation and brand asymmetries are low. How-
ever, while they were interested in how the characteristics of an industry might
lead to certain contractual arrangements, we want to find out how distribution
contracts affect quality choice which in turn determines product differentiation
and brand asymmetries.
In the next section we analyze the choice of contracts with exogenous qual-
ity. In the third section we relax the assumption of exogenous quality and focus
on the quality choices of the manufacturers under the previous contractual ar-
rangement. In the final section we conclude our findings.
2 The Model
Consider a market in which manufacturers produce differentiated products and
sell through retailers. Consumers are heterogenous in two dimensions. Each
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consumer has a most preferred retailer x ∈ [0, 1] and a quality valuation y ∈
[0, 1]. A consumer of type (x, y) buying a product of quality qi at the retailer j
derives the following utility
v + qiy − t|x− xj | − pij
where v is a positive constant common to all consumers, t > 0 is a preference
parameter and pij is the price of the ith product sold by retailer j. Consumers
are uniformly distributed over the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] with a total mass of
1 (see Figure 1). A consumer who is located at the point of coordinates (x, y)
has a preferred retailer that is x away from retailer A and 1 − x away from
the retailer B. We assume that v is large enough for each consumer to find a
product that leaves her with a nonnegative surplus. We normalize t to 1. This
amounts to a monotonic transformation of preferences.
Firm A Firm B
0 1
(x,y)
1
Figure 1: Location of firms and consumers on the unit square.
There are two manufacturers, 1 and 2, offering a product of quality q1, q2
and two retailers, A and B, located at the points of coordinates (0, 0) and (1, 0),
that is, the retailers have maximum horizontal differentiation. We assume that
q1 > q2 > 0. Manufacturers operate with ci marginal costs, where c1 > c2. The
retailers face no retailing costs above the costs of obtaining the products from
manufacturers.
We solve the following sequential game for subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. First, the manufacturers simultaneously decide whether to offer a recip-
rocally exclusive contract to a retailer and set their wholesale prices, w1 and
w2. These decisions become common knowledge after they have been made. In
the second stage, the retailers – after observing the previous stage’s outcome –
decide whether to accept the offer and compete in prices while taking the other
firm’s prices as given. A retailer always accepts an offer when that yields him
a non-negative profit. Consumers subsequently decide which product and at
which retailer to purchase, and profits are realized.
We consider two situations. In the first case no manufacturer engages in
exclusivity and therefore both products is available at each retailer shop for
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Figure 2: Market areas with and without exclusivity.
purchasing. In the second case exclusivity prevails and each manufacturer sells
its product exclusively to its retailer. Note that, when a manufacturer offers an
exclusive contract to a retailer implies that both manufacturers sell exclusively
its products. In this setting exclusivity by both manufacturers can be achieved
if at least one manufacturer choose to engage in exclusivity.
Finally, in this analysis we restrict our attention to the case when every
firm makes positive profits in equilibrium. To assure this we assume that the
quality difference is less then a benchmark above which all consumer would
prefer to buy the high quality product, yielding zero profit for the low quality
firm. Formally, we suppose the following assumption.
Assumption 1
c1 − c2
2
< q <
9 + c1 − c2
5
if c1 − c2 ≤ 1
c1 − c2
2
< q <
9− c1 + c2
4
if c1 − c2 > 1
where q ≡ q1 − q2
Let us first consider the case when no manufacturer commits itself to deal
exclusively with a retailer. In this case both products are available for pur-
chasing at any retailer. Figure 2 shows the division of the market between
retailers when no exclusivity occurs A consumer who is located at the points
of coordinates (x, y) will purchase the high quality rather then the low quality
product at retailer A if v + q1y − x − p1A ≥ v + q2y − x − p2A, i.e., if she is
located above the line y = p1A−p2Aq . That is, every consumer with a quality
valuation y′ > y strictly prefers to buy the high quality rather then the low
quality product at the retailer shop A. Furthermore, this consumer prefers to
buy a given quality product from retailer A rather then from retailer B, if and
only if v+ qiy− x− piA ≥ v+ qiy− (1− x)− piB . This implies that consumers
in the interval x ∈ [0, 1+piB−piA2 ] will purchase from retailer A , whereas those
with x ∈ ( 1+piB−piA2 , 1] will purchase from retailer B the product in question.
4
Let Dij(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) denote the demand function of product i at re-
tailer j. The expressions for these functions can be given as follows
D1A(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) =
(
1 + p1B − p1A
2
)(
1− p1A − p2A
q
)
(1)
D1B(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) =
(
1− 1 + p1B − p1A
2
)(
1− p1B − p2B
q
)
(2)
D2A(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) =
(
1 + p2B − p2A
2
)(
p1A − p2A
q
)
(3)
D2B(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) =
(
1− 1 + p2B − p2A
2
)(
p1B − p2B
q
)
(4)
Solving the game backward, first we consider the retailers’ competition. Re-
tailers choose simultaneously (p1A, p2A) and (p1B , p2B) respectively to maximize
their profits,
piA = (p1A − w1)D1A(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) + (p2A − w2)D2A(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B)
and
piB = (p1B − w1)D1B(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) + (p2B − w2)D2B(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B)
where wi denotes the wholesale price for product i.
This yields prices equal to p∗ij = 1 + wi, where i = 1, 2 and j = A,B.
Plugging these prices into the manufacturers profit function and maximizing
them with respect to w1 and w2 respectively yields
Lemma 2.1 Suppose no manufacturer offers exclusivity to retailers. The equi-
librium prices and profits are as follows (j = A,B).
p∗1j =
1
3
(3 + 2q + 2c1 + c2), p
∗
2j =
1
3
(3 + q + c1 + 2c2)
pi∗1 =
(2q − c1 + c2)2
9q
pi∗2 =
(q + c1 − c2)2
9q
Now suppose that manufacturer i deals exclusively with one of the retailers.
Without loss of generality we assume that the high quality manufacturer offers
an exclusive dealing to the retailer A and commits itself not to deal with retailer
B. In this case each product is available for purchasing only at one retailer. The
market is shared between retailers as is shown by the Figure 2. The utilities of
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type (x, y) from buying a high or a low quality product from the specific retailer
can be given as v + q1y − x− p1A and v + q2y − (1− x)− p2B . Therefore, for a
given y, the marginal consumer type in terms of x is
xˆ(y) =
1
2
(1 + qy + p2B − p1A) (5)
For any y ∈ [0, 1], consumers in the interval x ∈ [0, xˆ(y)] will purchase the high
quality product from retailer A, whereas those with x ∈ (xˆ(y), 1] will purchase
the low quality product from retailer B. Thus straightforward algebra implies
D1A(p1A, p2B) =
1
2
(
1 + p2B − p1A + q
2
)
(6)
and
D2B(p1A, p2B) =
1
2
(
1 + p1A − p2B − q
2
)
(7)
.
The retailers’ profit maximizing first-order conditions yield the equilibrium
consumer prices p∗1A =
1
3
(
3 + 2w1 + w2 +
q
2
)
and p∗2B =
1
3
(
3 + w1 + 2w2 − q2
)
.
Having derived the equilibrium prices in the retailers’ pricing subgame we can
move backward and analysing the manufacturers maximization problem. Man-
ufacturers choose wholesale prices that maximize their profits. Formally this
can be summarized in the following.
Lemma 2.2 If one or both manufacturer offers exclusivity the optimal prices
and profits can be given as
p∗1A =
1
9
(36 + 2q + 5c1 + 4c2) p
∗
2B =
1
9
(36− 2q + 4c1 + 5c2)
pi∗1 =
1
216
(18 + q − 2c1 + 2c2)2 pi∗2 =
1
216
(18− q + 2c1 − 2c2)2
This is a valid solution as long as the indifference line intersects the top and
the bottom sides of the unit square, i.e., as long as xˆ(0) ∈ (0, 1) and xˆ(1) ∈ (0, 1).
Indeed,
xˆ(0) =
1
18
(9− 4q − c1 + c2) ∈ (0, 1) (8)
and
xˆ(1) =
1
18
(9 + 5q − c1 + c2) ∈ (0, 1) (9)
hold if Assumption (1) is satisfied.
In the contracting stage manufacturers simultaneously decide whether to
offer exclusive contracts to retailers. From Lemma (2.1) and Lemma (2.2) it
follows that
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Proposition 2.1 The subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies are
the outcomes when at least one manufacturer offers an exclusive contract to
a retailer and that contract is accepted.
It is easy to verify why a unilateral exclusivity constitute an equilibrium.
Consider for example the case when the high quality manufacturer offers an
exclusive contract to a retailer. In this case manufacturer 1 earns a profit given
by the Lemma (2.2). Without exclusivity the profit can be given by the Lemma
(2.1). Thus, the difference of profits is
1
216
(18 + q − 2c1 + 2c2)2 − (2q − c1 + c2)
2
9q
(10)
which is always strictly positive whenever Assumption (1) is satisfied.
Note, that the outcome when both manufacturers offer exclusivity to a re-
tailer is always an equilibrium in this setup, while an accepted unilateral exclu-
sivity always generates the same market structure as the outcome when both
manufacturer has an exclusive retailer for its product. Furthermore, Propo-
sition (2.1) implies that at least a manufacturer will engage in exclusivity in
equilibrium.
3 Quality choices
So far we assumed that the qualities chosen by the manufacturers are fixed. As
the quality difference is crucial in evaluating the equilibrium outcomes a natural
question to ask is what level of quality difference will emerge in equilibrium if
manufacturers choose their quality as part of the game? In this section we
endogenize the manufacturers’ qualities and we model this by assuming that
firms simultaneously select their quality prior to the contracting choice.
Assume that manufacturers operate with ci(qi) marginal cost functions,
where c2(q) > c1(q) > 0 for every q > 0 and ci(·) is strictly convex and in-
creasing in quality levels for every i = 1, 2.
As we already know from the previous section manufacturers opt to deal
exclusively with the retailers and thus gain profits given by Lemma (2.2), where
the fixed marginal costs ci (i = 1, 2) are functions of the respective qualities.
Maximizing these profit functions with respect to quality levels, yields the fol-
lowing first order conditions:
1− 2c′1(q1) = 0 (11)
1− 2c′2(q2) = 0 (12)
Proposition 3.1 The marginal increase in average cost due to quality improve-
ment equals the average valuation of quality in the case of both firms, ie. they
optimize with respect to quality with the ”median consumer” in mind.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium quality choices.
The next proposition summarizes the main results for the firms’ equilibrium
quality choices.
Proposition 3.2 In equilibrium manufacturers choose strictly positive quality
levels. The more efficient firm selects a high quality level, while the other man-
ufacturer chooses a low quality status. Firms do not engage in maximal differ-
entiation.
Figure 3 helps in providing intuition for this outcome. Note that as far
as firms differ in efficiency they will choose different quality levels. Further-
more, observe that the quality difference between products increases with the
difference in cost functions.
4 Summary
We first proposed a non-cooperative game of successive duopolies with limited
strategy choice. We have shown that exclusive purchasing and distribution is
preferred to non-exclusive purchasing and distribution with any level of ver-
tical product differentiation. Then we relaxed the assumption that quality is
fixed and derived the equilibrium conditions for quality choices under exclusive
purchasing and distribution. Our final conclusion here is that under this distri-
bution arrangement, quality is going to be adjusted based only on the median
consumer’s valuation. This also means that vertical differentiation is going to
be limited and depends on the differences in the cost function with respect to
quality.
Generalizations of our results could include different distribution of con-
sumers in the consumer space, different set of feasible contracts, or a higher
number of retailers to induce richer strategic scenarios. Further steps taken in
analyzing how the set of (legally) feasible contract affects product quality could
greatly enhance our understanding of how antitrust policy should view certain
practices (e.g. exclusive dealing).
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